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I. INTRODUCTIONt
A. The Housing Association Alternative
Providing adequate housing for every American family is a large
and complex problem. The principal actors to date have been private
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t This paper is a revised and up-dated version of an original report to the
German Marshall Fund that has been incorporated in a Monograph of the Learning
From Abroad Series published by the Council for International Liaison. The
research on which it is based was performed by Professor Hetzel during the summer
of 1979 and the spring of 1980 in Great Britain and was supported by a grant from the
German Marshall Fund.
Specific credit should be given to a number of persons whose assistance made this
paper possible. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Mr. Nigel King of the National
Federation of Housing Associations and Mr. Ken Bartlett of the Housing Corporation
for their extensive comments regarding an earlier draft of this work. The insights
provided by Mr. Brian S. Quilter of the Department of the Environment, Mr. John
Coward of the Notting Hill Housing Trust, Mr. Harry Simpson of the Greater
London Council, Mr. Barry Natton of Merseyside Improved Houses, Mr. Barry
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developers and national and local government. The soaring cost of
housing has increased the gap between its cost and its reasonable af-
fordability for most persons. This widening gap reflects the inability
of private enterprise to supply sufficient, quality housing at an afford-
able price, particularly for those with low and moderate incomes.I In
an effort to maintain and stimulate a private developer role in the
provision of low-income housing through various subsidies and tax
incentives, the government has provided increasingly higher levels of
financial support. Such assistance has included below-market-rate
loans, interest subsidies, insured mortgages, waiver of federal taxes
on government securities to finance housing construction, land cost
write-downs, and tax deductability for mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes.2
Without passing judgment on the merits or success of these efforts,
we can safely say that the problem is far from solution. We know too
well that no simple solution exists. Intangible social considerations
and local variations in the nature of housing problems call for sophis-
ticated and flexible responses. Given the need for a concerted effort
by government and the private sector, it makes sense to explore alter-
native methods of combining public and private housing activity.
One such alternative, the housing association, has developed in Brit-
ain and many other European countries.3
From 1974 to 1980, voluntary non-profit housing associations have
evolved as a new force in British housing policy. The British govern-
Ollerenshaw of the City of Manchester, Mr. Tony Collison of the Housing
Corporation, and Professor Barry Cullingworth of the University of Toronto greatly
contributed to an understanding of the British housing association movement.
The authors thank Oksana Xenos for her assistance in updating this paper.
Finally, the research for this paper was made possible because of the interest in and
commitment to international technology transfers of Mr. C. Kenneth Orski, Vice-
President of the German Marshall Fund, whose support and encouragement is
especially appreciated.
1. See THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON URBAN HOUSING, A
DECENT HOME 45-47 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A DECENT HOME]. When people
must pay such a high proportion of their income (generally accepted as twenty-five
percent or more) that they must sacrifice other necessities, the price is too high. See
A. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 5 (1977).
2. See A DECENT HOME, supra note 1, at 53-59. For a brief description of some
of these programs, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ESTATE TAX SHEL-
TER SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES 15-18, 25 (1977).
3. See J.B. CULLINGWORTH, ESSAYS ON HOUSING POLICY: THE BRITISH SCENE
117 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CULLINGWORTH].
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HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
ment's ability to generate significant activity through this alternative
to public (council) housing,4 private rentals, and homeownership
means the British experience can provide important lessons for devel-
oping housing policies in the United States.
A housing association is an independent non-profit organization
whose purpose is to provide better housing.5 Although associations
mainly develop and manage rental housing, they may undertake
many other types of housing programs, including co-ownership
schemes, shared (equity-sharing) ownership, and housing for sale.'
Associations provide the major share of housing for groups with spe-
cial needs, such as the elderly, one and two person households, and
the disabled.7 Furthermore, they have been especially active in reha-
bilitating older properties, particularly in inner-city areas.8
Associations are meant to combine governmental responsiveness to
the public interest with entrepreneurial ability, efficiency, and crea-
tivity.9 The independence of associations distinguishes them from
government agencies and allows them to function with greater flex-
ibility.'° The actual extent of independence is a function of a contin-
ual tension between government attempts to control associations and
the struggle to maintain discretion over their own activities. Since
the government provides a substantial portion of association funds,
control over costs and use of subsidies becomes an important issue."
Associations have demonstrated that they can develop housing
eighteen to thirty months faster than local authorities.' 2 Some data
4. Public housing in Britain is usually called Council Housing, reflecting its man-
agement by the "Council" of the local housing authority.
5. H.C. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, FIFTH REPORT, HOUSING ASSOCIA-
TIONS AND THE HOUSING CORPORATION para. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMIT-
TEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS].
6. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1977-1978, at 16-17, 20 [here-
inafter cited as 1977-1978 REPORT].
7. Id at 6.
8. Id
9. See NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR 3, 7-8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE VOLUNTARY
SECTOR].
10. Id
11. See text accompanying notes 102 and 103 infra.
12. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, A STUDY OF THE NEW-
BUILD DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE FOR HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS 67-68 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NFHA STUDY].
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also reflect that associations achieve lower per unit capital and main-
tenance costs than do local authorities.13 When working without the
constraints of detailed government approvals,' 4 associations have il-
lustrated their flexibility by experimenting with different construction
standards that resulted in estimated savings of thirty per cent over
normal projects.' 5
Associations have also demonstrated the economic feasibility of re-
habilitation. Evidence of revitalization achieved through the applica-
tion by associations of public resources has enticed private developers
into rehabilitation investment in areas sufficiently "primed" by the
associations' activities.' 6
The conflicting needs of associations and government-separation
from government versus control over public funds--led to the crea-
tion in 1964 of a national Housing Corporation. Its functions are to
promote and register associations, to channel funds, and to monitor
association activities.' 7 This system of registration, cost limits, and
individual project review has been remarkably effective in assuring
proper use of the substantial subsidies that have stimulated the rapid
and significant contributions of associations.
B. The Record ofAchievement
The present statistics for housing associations in Britain are im-
pressive. By 1980, the Housing Corporation had registered over
2,900 associations.18 Of these, about 300 are almshouses (charitable
trusts),19 850 are co-ownership societies,20 and 300 are Abbeyfield so-
13. CoMMrrrEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. V, para. 4.
14. See text accompanying notes 178-92 infra.
15. MERSEYSIDE IMPROVED HOUSES, ANNUAL REPORT AND AccouNTs 27
(1979).
16. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 118.
17. Housing Act, 1964, c. 46, part I.
18. Letter from Nigel King, Chief Officer, Development and Research, National
Federation of Housing Associations, to Otto Hetzel 1 (April 29, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as King letter].
19. Almshouses, or charitable trusts, are usually small, privately-financed associa-
tions, few of which are registered with the Housing Corporation. They provide hous-
ing for the poor, catering generally to the elderly. THE HOUSING CORPORATION,
HOUSING ASSOCIATION TENANTS 1 (1979). Almshouses may be registered with the
Charity Commission or the Registrar of Friendly Societies or affiliated with the Na-
tional Association of Almshouses. NFHA, HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS: SOME INFOR-
MATION FROM THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS i (1978). See
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cieties for the elderly.2 ' Fewer than ten per cent of the associations
have over 500 units in management and an active development pro-
gram. 2 Yet these few housing associations have produced a signifi-
cant number of new and improved homes during the last six years,
securing 38,000 loans in 1979.13 This compares with a typical annual
production of 2,000 units in the 1960s. 2 Despite the extremely rigor-
ous and generalized belt tightening in the public sector by the Con-
servative government in Britain, the Housing Corporation still
expected to fund 20,000 units in 1980,' a number that may make
housing associations the major force in governmentally-financed
housing development.
The significance of the rapid growth of housing associations is two-
fold. First, it shows that a non-profit, voluntary movement can re-
spond quickly to government financial incentives and can become a
major factor in the government's current housing policy. Second,
their growth has been effectively targeted toward tenant groups and
locations where the most pressing problems exist. Associations have
had the following three major priorities since the 1974 Housing Act
propelled them into prominence:
1) Inner-city rehabilitation, especially in designated housing
improvement areas;
also NFHA, HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS: A COMMITTEE MEMBER'S HANDBOoK, app. 9,
A9.1, A9.3.
20. Co-ownership societies cater to those desiring a specific financial stake in their
own housing. Although members do not become owners of the units they occupy,
they can anticipate receiving a capital sum based on the increased value of their
dwellings upon leaving the society. Day-to-day management generally occurs under
the wing of a housing association. See NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HOUSING As-
SOCIATIONS, CO-oWNERSHIP HOUSING AssoCIATIONs (1978).
21. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7. Abbeyfield societies are a specialized
form of charitable trust focused on the needs of the elderly. They are usually small
and generally non-developers. Few are registered with the Housing Corporation
under the provisions of section 13 of the Housing Act of 1974. See THE HOUSING
CORPORATION, REPORT PROM THE HOUSING CORPORATION ON REGISTRATION
UNDER THE HOUSING AcT 1974, HC/9/76 Ag. 9(A), app. B (1976) [hereinafter cited
as REGISTRATION].
22. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, HOUSING ASSoCIATIoN TENANTS 49 (1979).
23. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, THE VOLUNTARY HOUSING MOVEMENT 6
(1979).
24. Department of Environment, Housing Associations table 5 (March, 1979) (un-
published internal memorandum on file with the author).
25. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, THE VOLUNTARY HOUSING MOVEMENT 6
(1979).
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2) General family housing in areas of acute housing stress,
with the emphasis on small projects and small units;
3) Housing to meet the special needs of single people, the eld-
erly, the handicapped, and other groups for whom there
may be inadequate provision, such as ex-psychiatric patients
and one-parent families.
26
In geographical terms, housing associations have concentrated
their activities in areas of depressed housing conditions.27 This ten-
dency to concentrate on the needs of the urban poor has evolved
from the philanthropic beginnings of the movement, when the prox-
imity of enormous wealth and enormous poverty prompted individu-
als and businesses to devote funds to the problem.28 The
government's allocation of grants and the willingness of larger as-
sociations in inner-city areas to take on the problems of rehabilitation
have reinforced this earlier emphasis. As a result, housing associa-
tion units are heavily concentrated in London and other cities, such
as Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham, that have experienced
the deterioration and social conditions typical of many American cit-
ies in the Northeast and Midwest.
In the United States, as in Britain, housing associations could sup-
plement existing efforts of local and national government. They have
proved capable of producing and managing housing units and of re-
sponding to special housing programs for a broad income spectrum.
29
Most recently, they also have provided a source of subsidized units
for sale.30 They can operate with much less government involvement
than can traditional public housing,31 and can provide an alternative
to both public housing and the private sector. The diminution of the
private rental sector in the United States threatens tenants who can-
not afford ownership of houses or condominiums. Here, as in Brit-
ain, housing associations could become a "third force" in the housing
field.32
26. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
27. Department of Environment, supra note 24, at 4.
28. 1d
29. THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR, supra note 9, at 11-12.
30. MERSEYSIDE IMPROVED HousEs, supra note 15, at 31.
31. As mentioned above, public housing has developed an increasing reliance on
private involvement. See A. DECENT HOME, supra note 1, at 59-67. The level of
government participation in housing association activity varies, and in some respects
the English system may entail too much government supervision.
32. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC AccoUNTs, supra note 5, app. II, para. 3.
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II. HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING
ASSOCIATIONS IN BRITAIN
Housing associations have existed in Britain for quite some time.
During the nineteenth century most of the early associations were
charitable trusts and almshouses established for the poor and sick.33
Although these types of associations still carry on such roles, they
have produced an insignificant amount of housing.34
The forerunners of the current housing associations were private
charitable organizations which provided housing for those unable to
do so for themselves.35 These organizations had little impact on
housing until the government recognized the necessity for subsidy to
meet the difference between the cost of decent housing and the ability
of the poor to pay for it.36
In 1919, Parliament enacted legislation37 to promote the activities
of housing associations, then known as housing trusts or public utility
societies. The law authorized local governments to make grants and
loans to housing associations, to invest in them, and to guarantee in-
terest payments on loans by others.38 The Housing Act of 193539 de-
fined "housing associations" and allowed the government to
recognize the National Federation of Housing Associations as the-
representative of the voluntary housing movement.4° This combina-
tion of public funding support and a quasi-independent national or-
ganization has continued to be a hallmark of the British system.
In its early years, the voluntary housing movement provided hous-
ing on a similar basis and for similar tenants as did the local govern-
ment's council housing.4" Housing associations essentially
supplemented local government housing by financing rental units
through local authority funding and charitable contributions.
In 1961,42 the government chose to expand the potential of volun-
33. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 117.
34. Id
35. Id
36, Id
37. Housing, Town Planning, Etc. Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 35.
38. Id §§ 18-20.
39. Housing Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 40, part II, §§ 26, 30.
40. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, THE VOLUNTARY HOUSING MOVEMENT 1
(1979). The Advisory Committee has now been disbanded.
41. See CULLINGWORTH, srupra note 3.
42. Housing Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 7.
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tary housing associations by using them to supplement the depressed
private house-building sector. The National Federation became ad-
ministrator of a £25 million loan fund to finance development by as-
sociations of units to rent for cost.43 This assignment contrasted with
the association's original role of providing housing for the working
classes at rents below market levels. The new objective was to use
cost-rent society housing associations to demonstrate the economic
feasibility of building houses to rent to the private housing develop-
ment sector.44
The Federation encouraged these cost-rent societies, basically com-
mercial operations, to compose their boards mainly of profession-
als--architects, solicitors, and real estate agents.45 Such boards
would have both the expertise to promote the projects and the moti-
vation to do so from the fees they would earn in providing the neces-
sary design, legal, and management services.46
The initial success of this experiment led to a £100 million expan-
sion in 1964 and the creation of the Housing Corporation to assume
the National Federation's role as promoter and financial channel.47
The alacrity with which the £25 million had been taken up under
section 7 of the 1961 Act pointed to the need for a special body
"whose general duty it shall be to promote and assist the develop-
ment of housing societies."148 Thus, with all-party support under the
1964 Act, the Housing Corporation came into being in September of
43. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 118.
44. Id
45. Another Government motive behind the 1961 and 1964 Acts was to see
whether professional people with housing expertise (at that time rather short of
work) would come forward to form housing societies (as defined in the 1964 Act)
and in return for their normal professional fees for the development work (archi-
tects' and solicitors' scale fees, for example) give the benefit of their knowledge
and advice free of charge to the society as a committee member. This was de-
scribed by the then Minister as "enlightened self-interest." The system provided
the required incentive: it worked very well and there was little abuse but it an-
gered the more traditional charitable housing associations, whose committees
were largely composed of laymen giving their services voluntarily and getting
nothing in return.
Letter from Ken Bartlett, Chief Officer, Housing Policy Division, The Housing Cor-
poration, to Otto Hetzel 2 (June 23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Bartlett letter].
46. Id
47. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, THE VOLUNTARY HOUSING MOVEMENT 2
(1979).
48. Housing Act, 1964, c. 46, part I, § I.
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that year. Doors opened for business early in January, 1965, with a
board of eight and a staff of eight.49
The 1964 Act envisioned use of Housing Corporation funds for
second mortgages to supplement loans from organizations serving
functions similar to those performed by savings and loans institu-
tions. These "building societies" were to finance two-thirds of the
cost of a project.50 As it turned out, however, building societies were
not especially interested in this intended role.5 ' In addition, other
options appeared more attractive to potential tenants.52
It is significant that of the first eighty-six schemes under section 7
of the 1961 Act, only six were of a co-ownership nature.53 By March
1966, 4,798 cost-rent dwellings had been approved as against 482 co-
ownership. 54 At that time, the Housing Corporation could only fund
new housing; and since housing is a "now" situation to those in need,
it soon became clear that groups of would-be co-owners would not
wait three years for their homes to be built. Cost-rent, both simpler
and more quickly available, was much more attractive.
Despite these advantages of cost-rent housing, availability of op-
tion mortgages for co-ownership schemes in 1967 made them even
more attractive.55 A tenant who could afford cost-rent could also af-
ford to participate in co-ownership schemes offering a share in the
equity as well as lower costs from the option mortgage subsidy. Op-
tion mortgage subsidies permitted mortgagors to pay a lower rate of
interest equivalent to the tax relief owners could receive on mortgage
interest payments. Since promoting associations could present the
same quality product at considerably less cost to the consumer, with
the added bonus of the possibility of a cash payment upon transfers,
it made economic sense to shift the schemes then under construction
from cost-rent to co-ownership.
56
Thus, the original cost-rent societies became sponsors of co-owner-
ship societies; they turned over fully occupied co-ownership estates to
the tenant/members but continued under the pre-existing agreements
49. Bartlett letter, sipra note 45, supp.
50. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 118-19.
51. Id
52. Id
53. Bartlett letter, m.pra note 45, supp.
54. Id
55. CULLINGWORTH, mpre note 3, at 118-19.
56. Bartlett letter, .pra note 45, supp.
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as managers.57 While the transformation was complicated, it pro-
duced nearly 1000 societies and some 38,000 homes." All of the
units were marketed at their full economic cost.59 Very few of these
societies were run on a co-operative basis.60 Most co-owners simply
wanted a place to live; their interest in, and arguments about, their
precise share of the equity arose only upon leaving.
Cost rents were also less attractive than subsidized (and thus lower-
priced) council housing. Moreover, cost rents suffered at the time
from increases in interest rates.6 ' This further discouraged those
persons who could not quite afford homeownership yet did not want
to look to local government for housing.
The unwillingness of building societies to participate ended the ex-
periment with co-ownership schemes by 1970.62 The Conservative
government, however, soon developed a new role for housing as-
sociations,63 envisaging "a special place" for them in housing policy
with government "encouragement and support."'  Associations were
to be included in that sector of the housing market which would be
subject to rent control under "fair-rent" provisions.65 The new Act
would thereby qualify association tenants for rent allowances. 66 The-
oretically, associations would obtain higher rental income and eligi-
ble tenants would experience little hardship from rent increases.67
New projects would also receive a subsidy to offset any deficits aris-
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id
61. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 118.
62. Id at 119.
63. The new role appeared in the White Paper, FAIR DEAL FOR HOUSING, CMND.
No. 4728 (1972).
64. Id at 16-17.
65. "Fair rent" is the name given to rents established by British rent control
schemes. Local rent officers determine these rents.
66. The Housing Finance Act, 1972, c. 47, part I, §§ 18, 19, established rent al-
lowances to provide additional funds for low-income tenants in private rentals. Rent
rebates, a similar program, apply to council housing.
67. Allowances are subject to a ceiling, somewhat higher in high-cost areas like
London. Tenants must pay the difference between rents charged and allowance pay-
ments. While the goal is that tenant contributions will not exceed a certain percent-
age of their income, the amount paid by low-income tenants in such areas may well
exceed these percentages.
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ing from fair rent limitations on rental income.68 The Housing Cor-
poration would have authority to fund all types of associations,69 and
local governments would continue to make loans as long as they
could nominate tenants for at least half the units produced. 70 These
provisions were incorporated in the Conservative government's 1972
Housing Act,7 ' and survived that Act's later repeal,72 as Labour sub-
stantially incorporated them into its 1974 Act.73 The Housing Act of
1974 formed the basis for the current housing association movement.
The impetus for the voluntary housing movement in the 1970s was
the decline of the private rental sector in Britain. Its steady reduction
to only fifteen percent of the housing market from a ninety percent
share at the turn of the century7' reflected the increasing roles under-
taken by local government as landlord and by developers for sales
housing. Rent controls and lack of tax incentives for landlords effec-
tively dried up the private rental sector. In addition, house prices
dramatically increased in the early 1970s, creating demands for pub-
lic sector building and for municipalization,76 the purchase by local
government of units from private landlords to add to the public
rental stock. Tenure choices dwindled to private homeownership or
public-sector rental. One solution seemed to lie in a broad expansion
of the housing association movement.
To accomplish this expansion, government provided major subsi-
dies to housing associations. 77 Both political parties found such sup-
port acceptable, though for differing reasons. The Conservatives
wished to prevent a monopoly of rental housing by municipal author-
ities.78 The Labour position was more complicated. In essence, La-
bour preferred non-profit rentals to private slumlords or
68. FAIR DEAL FOR HOUSn G, supra note 63, at 16.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Housing Finance Act, 1972, c. 47.
72. See Housing Act, 1974, c. 44.
73. Id
74. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR WALES, HOUSING POLICY: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT para. 8.09 (1977).
75. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 37.
76. Id
77. Id at 122.
78. Id at 121.
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homeownership.79 Labour viewed the housing association as a sup-
plement, not an alternative, to municipal housing. As stated in 1974
by Anthony Crosland, the Secretary of State for the Environment:
[I]t is utterly misconceived to regard the voluntary housing
movement as in any sense an alternative to municipal renting.
Local authorities alone have the capacity and responsibility to
tackle the major housing needs in their areas, and they will be-
come the principal suppliers of rented accommodation. Housing
associations can and will have a growing role in supporting local
authorities, particularly in meeting special needs and in the
worst areas of housing stress. They also have a role in the exten-
sion of social ownership of rented accommodation. But in all
this they must complement and supplement local authorities, not
supplant or compete with them. I also see a role for housing
associations in developing and experimenting with new forms of
tenant participation in the management of their dwellings. This
is an area in which they could provide a much needed
stimulus.80
Nevertheless, under the Labour government, associations became a
major component in the housing scene, with emphasis on rehabilita-
tion in improvement areas and provision of housing for the elderly
and groups with special needs." The Conservative government
which took over in 1979 has indicated that housing associations will
continue to play a significant if not primary role in their prior areas
of emphasis.8 2
A significant contribution of the 1974 Act to association growth
was a new subsidy system in the form of a Housing Association
Grant (HAG). 3 Such a grant covers the difference between the pro-
jected rental income and the cost of building plus the anticipated op-
erating costs for the project.' To ease the transition from older
subsidy schemes, which might have created difficulties under the new
rent procedures, a Revenue Deficit Grant was made available at the
discretion of the Secretary of State if an association incurred an over-
79. Id at 121-22.
80. 873 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) col. 48-49 (1974).
81. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 129.
82. State's G~p on Housing Associa/ions Loosened, London Times, Sept. 13, 1980,
at 2.
83. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part HI, § 29.
84. Id
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all deficit.85 Deficits could also occur under the new subsidy system
because of the theoretical and actual impact of fair rent controls on
anticipated project rental income. In particular, rent increases were
severely limited even though utility, maintenance, and other operat-
ing costs escalated during the current inflationary period. 6 The 1980
Conservative housing legislation has alleviated this problem by per-
mitting larger and more frequent rent increases in accordance with
the fair rent as actually determined. 7
The HAG is a very substantial grant supporting seventy-five to
over ninety percent of a given project's development and operating
costs.88 Rental income, therefore, is expected to pay only a rather
small portion of the total costs. Since the HAG is provided as a capi-
tal grant on completion of construction, its sufficiency depends on
the accuracy of theoretical predictions of future income and operat-
ing costs. A Grant Redemption Fund is set up in the 1980 housing
legislation to draw back any rental income surpluses.90 While hous-
ing association rents will still be somewhat higher than those in coun-
cil houses because of the different rent-fixing schemes applying to the
two sectors, 91 the true subsidies for identical houses will be less for
housing associations. This inequality results from the "rent pooling"
that usually occurs with council housing.92
The Housing Act of 197491 contained three interrelated policy ele-
ments that helped transform housing associations into a major force
in the English housing scene.
First, the government established a central promotional and moni-
toring institution, essential to structuring the new governmental pol-
icy. The Housing Corporation, which had been established in 1964
85. Id § 23.
86. NFHA, THE RESPONSE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HOUSING As-
SOCIATIONS COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT ON Hous-
ING POLICY 15-16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NFHA RESPONSE].
87. NFHA, A GUIDE FOR HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS TO THE NEW HOUsING BILL
11-12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NFHA GUIDE].
88. See King letter, supra note 18; THE HOUSING CORPORATION, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1978-1979, at 8 [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979 REPORT].
89. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, supra note 5, app. IX, § 5.
90. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VIII, § 131.
91. NFHA GUIDE, supra note 87, at 11-12.
92. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, supra note 5, app. V, paras. 7, 10-11. See
text at notes 273-77 infra.
93. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44.
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to promote housing association activity through supplemental loans,
became administrator of the new subsidies to housing associations. 94
Second, a mechanism was needed to control the associations and to
prevent abuse of the subsidies. The Act gave the Housing Corpora-
tion responsibility for administering a new system of registration to
insure that the associations receiving funds under the Act were quali-
fied and trustworthy.9' The registration scheme included power to
investigate the activities of associations and to take remedial action
when necessary. 96 Only registered associations could obtain Housing
Association Grants, and the Housing Corporation would continu-
ously monitor registrants to insure that they used funds in the public
interest.97 In addition, the government maintained effective control
on use of subsidies through detailed advance review of individual
projects by the Housing Corporation and, until late 1980, by the De-
partment of Environment (DoE).98 The Act guarded against exces-
sive costs by requiring that projects meet cost yardsticks applicable to
all public construction.99
Finally, the Act authorized financial aid through local authorities
as well as the Housing Corporation.10 The government anticipated
that twenty-five per cent of HAGs would come from local authorities
by way of central governmelit funds provided them for housing
construction.l 0l
III. CONTROL: PUTTING PUBLIC FUNDS TO PROPER USE
Loans and grants originating from the central government consti-
tute over ninety-nine percent of the capital finance of housing as-
sociations.'1 2 The "fair rent" system that limits lower-income tenant
rents makes requisite these high levels. To keep these rents at tolera-
ble levels, grants must cover a very high percentage of the total costs,
including operating expenses.
94. Id part I.
95. Id part IL, § 13.
96. Id part IL
97. Id
98. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, supra note 5, app. I.
99. Id at vii, § 14.
100. Housing Act, 1974, part II, § 67.
101. See NFHA, A BASIC GUIDE TO HOUSING ASSOCIATION GRANTS (1979).
102. THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR, supra note 9, at 2.
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In 1979, public funding to housing associations exceeded £600 mil-
lion.10 3 The magnitude of this funding makes control an important
issue. It may be the most difficult problem the voluntary housing
movement faces because the nature of associations as independent
decisionmakers conflicts with the concept of tight government con-
trol. Government must find a proper balance which allows adequate
safeguard of the public interest without stifling the independence that
distinguishes housing associations.
A. Registration: More Than a Rubber Stamp?
Registration is the first control aimed at insuring the proper use of
housing association grants and loans. A determination of compe-
tency and trustworthiness is the initial basis for an association's regis-
tration. "4 The Housing Corporation is responsible for maintaining a
registry of approved associations; only registered associations are eli-
gible to receive HAGs.'l0 A Housing Association Registration Advi-
sory Committee, established by the 1974 Act" 6 and existing until
1979, assisted in developing criteria for the following statutory
requirements.
First, the association must be previously registered as a charity or
society under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1965.17
The same provision mandates that housing associations be non-profit
organizations.108
Second, the association must be under the control of responsible,
experienced people who can be trusted to handle public funds.'09
The constitution or rules of the association must vest control in a
committee of management or similar group having no conflict be-
tween the association's interests and their personal financial af-
fairs. 10 Although earlier legislation had encouraged self-interest by
board members to take advantage of their expertise,' the govern-
103. Id
104. REGISTRATION, supra note 21, at 1.
105. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part II, § 17.
106. Id § 14.
107. Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1965, c. 12. Additional restrictions
and requirements may be found in the Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part II, § 13.
108. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part II, § 13.
109. COMmiTTEE OF PUBLIc AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. IV, § 2.
110. Id § 2(3).
111. See text at notes 45-46 supra.
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ment decided by 1974 to prohibit committee members from entering
into contracts with and taking professional fees from the associa-
tion.112 The 1974 provision thus seeks to insure that the committee
makes its decisions in the interest of the association, free from the
influence of possible personal gain for committee members. Until
1980, an association could only receive registration if a majority of
the committee had no such conflicts. Prohibited conflicts included
contractual relationships with any firm in which a committee mem-
ber or his or her family were involved as partners or directors, owned
collectively in excess of ten percent of share capital, or had an inter-
est in at least ten percent of distributed benefits." 3
The 1980 housing legislation"' banned all conflicts, regardless of
the level of involvement. Exceptions had been allowed because of
the fear that totally restricting such involvements would prevent
many competent and highly experienced people from serving on
committees. 1 5 While a total prohibition of conflicts may be neces-
sary for associations to be entrusted with public funds, the changes in
this policy reflect the problem of balancing the need for control with
the desire to have a skilled independent organization active in solving
local housing problems. Even in the absence of legislation requiring
it, many associations have avoided all financial conflicts of interest
among committee members," 6 and have required disclosure where
such self-dealing has occurred." 7
Third, the housing association must maintain proper financial con-
trol and accounts of its operations. It must use appropriate book-
keeping procedures, make annual reports, and demonstrate financial
stability." The rules of the association must prohibit the distribu-
tion of surplus funds or assets to members of the association or its
committee members, or members of their families. 1 9 The overhead
of the association, including salaries, must be reasonable in relation
112. COMMITrEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. IV, § 2(3).
113. Id
114. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VIII, § 126, sch. 16.
115. See REGISTRATION, supra note 21, at 11-12.
116. Id
117. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, Cir. 170/74, HOUSING ACT 1974--Hous-
ING CORPORATION AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS para. 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
DoE, HOUSING AcT 1974].
118. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. IV, § 3.
119. Id § 3(3).
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to the size and activity of the association. 2 ° Such a standard requires
the Housing Corporation to determine whether staff salary levels are
appropriate. This presents another difficult judgment that reduces an
association's discretion and calls for weighing the cost of maintaining
a well-qualified staff against the need for economical use of public
funds.
Fourth, the association should be capable of efficient management.
In accordance with its size and activity level, an association must
show that it has access to skills relevant to the provision and manage-
ment of housing. 2 ' A showing of qualified staff, a past record of
successful project execution, or access to qualified outside consultants
can satisfy the requirement.' 22
Fifth, the housing association must justify its appropriateness for
registration in terms of its proposed role and scope of activity in rela-
tion to plans of other associations and to housing needs in its in-
tended area of operation.'23 This requirement relates more to the
problem of coordination than control, and is meant to prevent dupli-
cation of effort and to promote efficient use of limited resources. 124
Finally, the association must apply for registration in the form pro-
vided by the Corporation. The application constitutes an agreement
to comply with the registration requirements in the future and to aid
the Corporation in monitoring that compliance.1
25
The Housing Corporation reported in 1976 that the registration
process was a success. 126 According to the Corporation, the chief
benefit of registration was that associations carefully scrutinized
themselves and, in cooperation with the Corporation, adjusted their
structure and methods of operation to conform to the registration cri-
teria. 27 The Corporation reported that the thorough screening of
registered associations insures a basic level of trustworthiness that
warrants the provision of public funding.' 21
Most associations were registered in an initial surge of over 2,000
120. Id § 3(5).
121. Id § 4.
122. Id
123. Id § 5.
124. The problem of coordination is dealt with in more detail in Part IV, infra.
125. COMMITrEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. IV, § 6.
126. REGISTRATION, .upra note 21, at 3-6.
127. Id at 3-4.
128. Id at 4.
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applications. 129 Among the Ill rejected, 3' the most frequently un-
satisfied requirement was the demonstration of a need for the pro-
posed role of the association (ninety-nine applicants).3" Other
reasons for rejection related to conflict of interest of committee mem-
bers (fifty-four applicants), managerial skills (twenty-six applicants),
and financial control (only four applicants).'3 2
Clearly the initial registration process was regarded as a "coarse
sieve." Furthermore, registration may have permitted the Housing
Corporation to exercise more control than if no registration were re-
quired. Despite the Corporation's favorable report, however, some
observers doubt the adequacy of registration scrutiny.1 33 Effective
examination of applicants may be more realistic now that the initial
surge is over. Formation of new associations is waning: during the
year ending March 31, 1978, only 287 associations were registered, 134
and in the following year, 162 registrations resulted from 185
applications. 135
B. Monitoring Keeping Things on the Level
After registration, the supervision and control of housing associa-
tions continue in the form of ongoing monitoring by the Corporation.
The 1974 Act empowers the Corporation to remove members of the
management committee or officers of an association; to directly con-
trol the financial transactions of the association; to take charge of its
assets or place them in more reliable hands; and to dissolve an asso-
ciation and wind up its affairs. 13 6
The monitoring function got off to a slow start because of the regis-
tration overload accompanying the system's introduction. 37 The
Corporation instituted in-depth monitoring visits in 1977, but made
only seventy such visits by the end of 1978.138 The Corporation plans
an increase in the frequency of visits (it intends to make about 250
129. Id at 2-3.
130. Id app. B.
131. Id
132. Id
133. NFHA REsPONSE, supra note 86, at 12.
134. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
135. 1978-1979 REPORT, supra note 88, at 20.
136. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part II, §§ 19-20.
137. See REGISTRATON, supra note 21, at 22.
138. COMMrIrEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, viii, para. 7.
[Vol. 21:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/3
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
relatively detailed visits per year, plus spot audits of all of the ap-
proximately 950 associations receiving public funds139) with a corre-
sponding decrease in the depth of scrutiny.
Monitoring problems accompanied association reports of annual
accounts to the Corporation and its scrutiny of them." Until a com-
puter system was installed, the Corporation's inability to inform as-
sociations about their indebtedness delayed audits and account
submissions.' 41 The Public Accounts Committee of the House of
Commons has recommended a crackdown on lateness or failure to
submit such reports. The Corporation has strengthened its staff to
meet the increased workload.'42 In addition, the 1980 legislation for
the first time requires accounts submitted within six months of the
end of the accounting period. 43
During fiscal year 1977-78, the Corporation made thirty monitor-
ing visits; two revealed a need for further investigation of possible
mismanagement or misconduct under section 19 of the 1974 Act.'"
Six additional section 19 inquiries began during the same year based
on information the Corporation received during the course of its or-
dinary contacts with associations.145
The approach to monitoring may be crucial as the following com-
mentary illustrates:
One of the issues which is emerging from monitoring is the ac-
tual substance of the monitoring. Inevitably when carried out by
low calibre staff monitoring has to consist of administering a
check list and becomes a slightly naive, standardised examina-
tion of the details of procedures. It is yet further interference in
what is supposedly a "voluntary" movement which tends in the
normal bureaucratic way to inhibit initiative, stifle enthusiasm
and so on. Arguably monitoring should concentrate on the over-
allpeformance of the association. The question is, is it achiev-
ing results? Is it housing the poorest people? Is it producing
schemes quickly and economically? The means of achieving
these ends may be different but what is important is the achieve-
ment of the goal which too often appears to be getting lost in the
139. Id
140. Id para. 8.
141. Bartlett letter, supra note 45, at 2-3.
142. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC AccoUNTs, supra note 5, ix, para. 9.
143. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VIII, § 124(3).
144. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
145. Id at 14-15.
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desire to have detailed control.146
The Board of the Corporation decides when to institute an inquiry
and appoints an investigator to make a report.' 47 If the Board con-
cludes that there has been misconduct or mismanagement, it gives the
association and the parties involved an opportunity to respond, and it
observes additional procedures to safeguard individual rights.' 48
Of thirteen inquiries instituted by the end of 1978, six were consid-
ered serious enough to warrant police investigation, though half of
these resulted in a clean bill of health. 49 Some resulted in minor
reforms, while others revealed that mismanagement had existed for
years. 150
Sanctions have included appointments by the Corporation of addi-
tional committee members, removal of committee members, freezing
of association assets in bank accounts, restriction of association trans-
actions without Corporation approval, transfer of assets to other reg-
istered housing associations, and winding up of associations.' 5 1
With over 2,900 associations registered 52 and subject to the sanc-
tions of the Corporation, it seems remarkable that only thirteen in-
quiries were made prior to 1979. The Corporation apparently deals
with many potential mismanagement problems informally through
training and assistance. 53 Further, the extensive, even excessive,
controls over associations' activities have probably prevented sub-
stantial problems. For example, most of the subsidy applies to the
capital cost of the building; in addition, limits apply on the amount
expendable on acquiring individual properties. Each stage of the de-
velopment process faces detailed scrutiny, e.g., loan, tender, and de-
sign approvals. Money is advanced to the association only against
certificates issued by consultants, 154 and must be passed on to the
contractor under the terms of contract. When the HAG is paid, as-
sociations have a residue mortgage to repay from the rents.'5 5 This
146. King letter, supra note 18, at I.
147. COMMITrEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. I, § 8.
148. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
149. COMMITrEE OF PUBLIC AccOuNTS, supra note 5, app. II, §§ 6, 7.
150. Id paras. 6, 11-18.
151. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 14-15.
152. King letter, supra note 18, at 1.
153. 1978-1979 REPORT, supra note 88, at 21.
154. King letter, supra note 18, at 2.
155. Id
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tight control of the building process means that there is relatively lit-
tle opportunity for impropriety.' 56
An additional statutory control on association transactions is the
requirement of Section 2 of the 1974 Act restricting the disposal of
assets by registered housing associations. 5 7 The Corporation must
first consent, and generally it has consented only when the sale serves
some public function, such as when land is sold to a local authority
under Compulsory Purchase Order, or for public utility easements. 58
To reduce paperwork, the Corporation has authorized some of these
routine public transfers under General Consents; other sales require
individual consents.' 59 These controls are meant to insure that assets
acquired with public funds remain in use for the public benefit.
C. Individual Scheme Scrutiny. Under the Magnfying Glass
Probably the most controversial control mechanism is the require-
ment of individual approval for each subsidized housing scheme un-
dertaken by associations."° The objective of these reviews is to
insure that the scheme in question meets a need which justifies sub-
stantial subsidy, and that the scheme is designed to comply with cost
standards for the efficient use of public funds.' 6 '
The Housing Association Grant is the basic means of providing
subsidies to housing associations.' 62 Loans from either the Housing
Corporation or local authorities finance projects supported by such
grants.' 63 After completion of a project, the association receives the
grant as a capital sum'" which reduces the loan debt to a level that,
allowing for operating expenses, can be serviced out of the project's
rents and other income.'
Since the grant is calculated from estimates of future income and
156. Id
157. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part II, §§ 21-25.
158. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
159. Id
160. See THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR, supra note 9.
161. DoE, HOUSING ACT 1974, supra note 117, para. 36.
162. See text at notes 83-84 and 88 supra.
163. DoE, HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR PART IN CURRENT HOUSING
STRATEGIES para. 2.8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CURREr HOUSING STRATEGIES].
164. See note 89 supra.
165. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part III, §§ 29-30.
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operating expenses, 166 the 1974 Act also authorized the payment of a
Revenue Deficit Grant for associations which incur deficits in their
annual revenue accounts. 167 Such grants, discretionary on the part of
the Secretary of State, cover unavoidable revenue and development
costs which exceed allowances. For example, a subsequent govern-
ment decision to phase in rent increases for sitting tenants 168 strained
the initial HAG formula described above.' 69 In addition, a defect in
the original legislation 70 can prevent the true cost of service charges
from being recovered."' These two examples alone account for sixty
percent of the revenue deficit grants paid.'7 2
This subsidy structure provides no inherent incentives for effi-
ciency. "Value for money" is the phrase used in England to label the
issue of cost efficiency. For HAGs, the approach used to achieve effi-
ciency is solely regulatory.
The DoE promulgates regulations defining eligible costs and set-
ting expenditure limits. 17 Cost limits and standards should be realis-
tic without unduly reducing flexibility and innovation. Cost
yardsticks can create problems if they are not updated in a timely
manner. Limits must be revised or "indexed" to keep pace with ris-
ing costs beyond the control of associations. Recently, the limit on
sums available for rehabilitation projects has been increased by ten
percent to compensate for elevated costs and further increases are
under consideration.'7 4
The importance of setting and revising cost limits lies in the effect
on life cycle costs of housing, including maintenance and repair. A
higher initial capital expenditure can reduce operating costs and ex-
tend the useful life of a given housing unit.'7 1 If comers are cut to
166. See note 89 supra.
167. See note 85 supra.
168. Increases were limited to about $1.70 per week per annum, regardless of the
registered or re-registered rent.
169. See text at note 84 supra. The 1980 legislation, however, allows somewhat
greater rent increases than had previously been allowed. See Housing Act, 1980, c.
51, part II, sch. 10.
170. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part III.
171. COMMITrEE OF PUBLIC AccoUNTs, supra note 5, app. IX, paras. 3, 10.
172. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part III, § 32.
173. Id § 29(5).
174. NFHA, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1978).
175. Id Higher construction standards may likely generate savings in several ar-
eas, ag., energy costs (with significance broader than simply that for the individual
[Vol. 21:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/3
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
save on capital costs, this failure to build to higher standards will
probably result in the need for capital infusions within four or five
years.' 76 The housing problem, however, calls for a long-term solu-
tion. To prevent such short-sighted restrictions on capital expendi-
ture, a National Federation of Housing Associations report
17 7
recommends the separation of property acquisition cost from the cost
of subsequent work, and the provision of a variable element for re-
pair costs.
Depth and repetition of scheme scrutiny have raised a more serious
problem. Associations must submit detailed proposals for approval
by the local authority, on the planning side, and by the lending au-
thority (either the local authority or the Corporation).178 The law has
also required approval by the Department of Environment, but in
1980 the Minister announced elimination of this requirement. 179
Even individual unit rehabilitation projects have normally been sub-
ject to ten separate approvals between locating a site and commenc-
ing construction.18 0
Differences of opinion arising between the public bodies over de-
tails of a scheme must be resolved before the project may proceed.' 8 '
Review by authorities has been so detailed that on one occasion, an
association correpsonded with a regional Corporation officer for
some time regarding whether an eighteen inch working surface be-
side a stove was necessary. 182 In another case, after reviewing plans
for eight weeks, the DoE regional office recommended a reduction in
the number of cupboard shelves from three to two for a total saving
of £8.' s3
Such close review and detailed changes are not appropriate to the
independent role of the housing associations. Moreover, the resulting
tenant) and management costs (through reduced tenant dissatisfaction and rent
arrearage).
176. King letter, supra note 18, at 2.
177. NFHA, ANNUAL REPORT (1978).
178. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § III, para. 63.
179. State's Grip on Housing Associations Loosened, London Times, Sept. 13,
1980, at 2.
180. THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR, supra note 9, at Annex II.
181. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § III, paras. 63-64.
182. THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR, supra note 9, at 15.
183. Id
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delays are costly. The 1980 legislation'84 calls for a direct grant to
cover administrative costs, a change from the previous subsidy of a
one to two percent surcharge on capital costs. 185 In addition, the
DoE has incurred costs for salaries and overhead both at the Re-
gional and Central office approval levels. 18 6 As noted, however,
these costs of double review have now been terminated.
18 7
One study concludes that since the HAG scheme began, the time
from designation of initial site interest to loan approval has increased
considerably, although overall pre-contract time has remained rela-
tively constant.1 88 It is also apparent that housing associations are
subject to a uniquely high level of sometimes conflicting scrutiny.' 89
The costs of delay include inflation, interest payments after property
acquisition, repair of deteriorating vacant property, and loss of rental
income. 19°
A situation in which reviewers required deletions meant to save
about £1,000 per unit illustrated the false economy of too close a re-
view of project schemes. By the time the project was re-tendered for
bids, the contract price had actually risen £400.191
"Penny wise and pound foolish" has been the criticism of excessive
scheme scrutiny. As well as wasting money, these reviews reward
conformity; there is an incentive to design and execute projects in a
standardized format to obtain faster approvals. This result defeats
the idea of the association as a creative, independent entity. With so
many levels of review, the morale of housing association staff can
only suffer from the extensive outside interference.192 Individual ap-
proval of projects is one step in the control process which appears to
be seriously out of balance with the rest. Although registration and
monitoring supposedly serve to insure trustworthiness, associations
obviously have not been trusted.
In 1980, the government finally recognized that it could avoid
needless duplication of work by delegating the task of in-depth scru-
184. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VIII, § 121.
185. NFHA REsPONSE, supra note 86, § III, para. 64.
186. Id
187. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
188. NFHA STUDY, supra note 12, at 67.
189. See THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR, supra note 9.
190. Id at 14-15.
191. Id at 15.
192. Id at 3-4.
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tiny to one body.'93 That role fell most appropriately to the Housing
Corporation because of its experience with individual associations.
Furthermore, the Corporation's assumption of this responsibility
seems to comport with Parliament's original intention. 194 If any
phase of the control process called for a 'rubber stamp' approval, it
was the DoE's review of schemes recommended by the Corporation,
since the Corporation was supposed to be the Department's agent. 95
The Housing Corporation has attempted to institute "streamlined
procedures" for housing associations doing rehabilitation work.'9 6
Some requirements for advance approval seemingly could be
changed to subsequent reviews in areas where standards are clear
enough to be readily followed. Associations could avoid much delay
if the Corporation performed detailed checking after the fact when-
ever possible; this task could be part of the Housing Corporation's
monitoring function.
Critics of the current system argue that the Housing Association
Grant subsidy should be changed.' 97 They point out that the current
grant may be too generous because it is based on a projection of
rental income at current levels, and actual rent increases may provide
a windfall to the association.198
The problem is that the HAG system gives a once-and-for-all grant
which writes off a large part of the capital cost. The outstanding loan
is fixed, which means that over the life of the scheme the costs of
repayment fall in real terms. In contrast, the levels of rent can be
expected to rise at least in line with the increase in average earnings.
Therefore, there will be a growing real gap between the repayment of
the loan and the rental incomes. Some of the gap will be narrowed
by increases in management and maintenance costs, which are likely
to move up at roughly the same rate as rents. Nevertheless, since
management and maintenance costs are included in the initial calcu-
lation of the HAG and it is only the net rent that has to be earmarked
for repaying the loan, there could be a growing surplus. Not only
will rents rise, but they will increase relative to the grant and the loan
193. COMMrEE OF PUBLIC AccoUNTs, supra note 5, app. II, para. 4.
194. Id at x, para. 13.
195. Id at vii, para. 2.
196. NFHA REsPONSE, supra note 86, § III, para. 65.
197. COMMITrEE OF PuBLIC AccouN s, supra note 5, at ix, para. 12.
198. Id
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repayment.199
One answer to this situation is the Grant Redemption Fund that
the 1980 legislation created,2" which will draw back excessive accu-
mulations where rising rental income exceeds expenses. In practice,
the government is likely to draw back surpluses only if the associa-
tion fails to apply the surpluses to provision of housing.2 0' The sur-
pluses, therefore, could give associations an element of independence
as long as they use the funds to further their housing responsibilities.
A suggested alternate method of subsidy would provide an annual
grant to the association based on its total activities.2"2 Proponents
contend that this method would eliminate the need for scheme-by-
scheme scrutiny.2 °3 The value of eliminating detailed review of as-
sociations with less than excellent "track records" must be weighed
against the desirability of a weakened control function.
Even if the subsidy is altered, housing associations will probably
remain "riskless" operations so long as they comply with governmen-
tal standards. Otherwise, association activity would severely dimin-
ish or even cease." 4 Considering government's tight rein on subsidy
availability and use, it does not seem feasible to ask associations to
assume the risks of factors beyond their control which may seriously
affect either income or costs.
D. Internal Controk Committee Responsibility and
Public Accountability
With all of the external checks on housing associations, it is easy to
overlook the fact that the first line of control is really the internal
structure of associations. Recently, concern has focused on various
aspects of internal control. While ultimate responsibility for associa-
tion actions rests in the committee of management, 20 5 the commit-
tee's control is limited by its access to information and its level of
sophistication about the issues involved. The conffict of interest re-
strictions are likely to render ineligible a number of knowledgeable
199. King letter, supra note 18, at 3.
200. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VIII, § 131.
201. King letter, supra note 18, at 3.
202. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § III, para. 74.
203. Id
204. Id at para. 71(ii).
205. NFHA, GROWING PAINS: COPING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF GROWTH IN
HOuSING ASSOCIATIONS 15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GROWING PAINS].
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persons. Thus financial reporting requirements have been added to
the number of formal controls that ensure financial responsibility.
The accountability of associations also extends to the social and
political aspects of their activity.' 6 This is particularly true of as-
sociations whose growth and activity make them a major influence in
the areas in which they operate, but the need applies to all associa-
tions because of their collective impact on the national housing
scene.2"7 The objective is to make associations more responsive to
local housing needs in general and in particular to the needs of their
tenants.0 8 The public's right to expect such responsiveness flows
from the associations' receipt of public funds.
The first means of increasing responsiveness was to fully disclose
association activities and policies to the organizations with which
they deal, the people they house, and the communities in which they
operate.2°9 The 1978 recommendations of the Housing Corporation
have now been incorporated in a new "Tenant's Charter" in the 1980
legislation, that applies to associations and most public sector
landlords.210
In general, the legislation requires disclosure and consultation with
tenants.2 11 For instance, an association will now have to publish its
tenant selection policies.212 It should also publish annual reports and
accounts, housing policies, composition of the committee and the
membership, number of staff and salaries, information on current
work and future development, method of awarding contracts, and
contractors and professionals employed by the association. It must
disclose the financial interests of its committee members under the
Housing Act of 1974.213
Associations should use public meetings, open houses, or similar
activities as part of a consultation process to increase popular aware-
ness and to include tenant views on management decisions.2 14 Such
activities are likely to increase political support of the voluntary
206. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, Cir. 3/78, IN THE PUBLIC EYE para. 2.
207. Id at para. 7.
208. Id at paras. 2 and 20.
209. Id at paras. 8-13.
210. See Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part I, ch. II.
211. Id §§41, 43, 44.
212. Id § 44(1)(a).
213. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, supra note 206, at para. 9.
214. Id para. 12.
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housing movement.215 In addition, associations should establish
closer links with local authorities and other voluntary bodies.216
Broadening the membership of associations and management com-
mittees could increase responsiveness. The Corporation suggested
maintaining a balance of interests by dividing the membership of an
association into three blocks: tenants, local authorities and commu-
nity groups, and individually interested people.217 The Corporation
also recommended delegation of management to area committees if
an association has grown too large for the committee to maintain
contact with the tenants, staff, and community.218 Alternatively, such
an association could delegate some responsibilities to
subcommittees.219
The concept of tenant participation has become a major focus for
the public sector.220 Associations will have a duty to consult tenants
when changing policy or practices or creating new programs involv-
ing management, maintenance, improvement, or demolition.22' Only
changes in rents or service will not require consultation.222 Associa-
tions must inform affected tenants of changes and of the availability
of consultation arrangements and give the tenants an opportunity to
express their views.223
Because housing associations exist to provide for their tenants'
needs, associations should answer to the tenants they house as well as
to the general public whose money they spend.224 These new consul-
tation rights could work in a number of ways. For example, tenants
willing to accept the responsibility could become members of associa-
tions and committees.22 Other recommended means of achieving
tenant input include encouraging the formation of tenant associa-
215. Id para. 22.
216. This idea is discussed at greater length in relation to the need for coordina-
tion, infra Part IV.
217. THE HOUSING CORPOL'TION, supra note 206, at paras. 17-18.
218. Id at para. 19.
219. Id
220. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § III, paras. 68-70.
221. NFHA GUIDE, supra note 87, at 8-9.
222. Id at 8.
223. Id at 8-9.
224. THE HOUSING CoRpoRAnroN, supra note 206, at para. 20.
225. Id On the other hand, the Corporation fears that complete control by ten-
ants might divert the association from its other responsibilities. Id
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tions, consulting tenants about design and management, or even dele-
gating management responsibilities to tenants.22 6 Some
experimentation is occurring in the formation of management coop-
eratives by tenants with the support of the association, which will
allocate a budget from its income to the tenant cooperative.' 7 Ten-
ants thus make most of the management decisions themselves.
IV. COORDINATION: CLOSE CONTACT AND MUTUAL
COOPERATION
The British scheme for administering housing association activities
requires extensive coordination. Inherent problems of coordination
exist when more than one organization is attacking the housing prob-
lem. Figure "A" is a simplified diagram illustrating the flow of fund-
ing to housing associations. Under the 1974 Act, one quarter of
association funding was to come from local authorities and the other
three quarters through the Housing Corporation."2 While this sys-
tem complicates financing arrangements, its advantage lies in offering
an alternative should one source become exhausted.229 More impor-
tantly, this dual system promotes a balance of interest between na-
tional and local goals.10
226. Id at para. 21.
227. Id Although many tenants prefer a traditional landlord-tenant relationship,
some tenants may wish to assume management responsibilities, such as maintenance
of common areas. The Corporation backs a management cooperative pilot program.
228. CURRENT HousiNG STRATEGIS, supra note 163, at para. 2.8.
229. Id Since all funding starts with the Department of Environment, this ad-
vantage is probably of minor significance.
230. Id
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FIGURE "A"
SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF HousING ASSOCIATION FUNDING
A local authority and several independent housing associations
may each be actively engaged in housing activities within the same
geographic area. The Housing Corporation or the local authority
may independently develop and fund housing association schemes.
There was concern that this could lead to duplication of effort or,
worse, competition among various associations and the local author-
ity in such activities as acquisition of property.23'
The Housing Corporation has developed a coordination mecha-
nism for this problem. Before the Housing Corporation develops its
programs and makes its allocations to associations each year, the
Corporation's Regional Officers hold regular meetings and consult
231. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § I, para. 29.
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with the National Federation and every local authority.2 32 Associa-
tions also consult with local authorities when making their bids for
allocations of housing subsidies. The Corporation registers all con-
struction sites or rehabilitation properties which receive Corporation
funding to prevent abortive competition among associations.233 The
local authority receives copies of the registration. Similarly, local au-
thorities are to notify the Housing Corporation when an association
has approached them for funding."3 Under Section 2 of the 1974
Act,23 5 a mortgage grant requires the Corporation's consent at the
purchase stage. Since the mortgage application gives full details, the
Housing Corporation knows which local authority is funding which
association(s) and to what extent.236
While the main purpose of registration under the 1974 Act is to
facilitate control, it also begins the process of coordinating the activi-
ties of housing associations and all the other actors in the housing
field.
In the initial surge of registration applications pursuant to the Act,
the majority of rejections were based upon the proposed role of the
association in question.23 7 Some associations had no current housing
stock or definite projects and could not demonstrate a need for their
existence.238 When potential conflicts of purpose and scope appeared
in registration applications, the Corporation often deferred determi-
nations to allow the associations to consider mergers or similar
arrangements.239
Registration is, however, only a preliminary step in both control
and coordination. Some associations, for example, are growth-ori-
ented and expand beyond their original objectives. Others may de-
velop conflicts or duplications of effort during their operations that
the Corporation could not foresee from broad statements of purpose
in registration applications. Yet, to require more specific coordina-
tion at registration could so restrict the role of individual associations
as to destroy the element of flexibility.
232. Bartlett letter, supra note 45, at 4.
233. Id
234. Id
235. Housing Act, 1974, c. 44, part I, § 2.
236. Bartlett letter, supra note 45, at 4.
237. REGISTRAMON, upra note 21, at 14-15.
238. Id
239. Id
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The encouragement of mergers or amalgamations at this stage has
some merit, but they too can be overdone;' 4 some larger associations
function very well, but smaller organizations have their place.
Whereas coordination problems could be avoided by allowing only
one association to register in any given locale, such restriction of as-
sociation activity would defeat the fundamental advantages of flex-
ibility, independence of action, and provision of alternative housing.
Only two housing providers, the association and housing authority,
would exist for each locality, with each association compelled to act
within the same area as its corresponding local authority.
Housing associations have successfully used "zoning"--the restric-
tion of their activities to separate areas-to avoid conflict. Some-
times, however, "zoned" and "unzoned" associations operate in the
same location.2 ' If several registered associations operate in the lo-
cale of a given authority, and some associations operate across the
territories of two or more local authorities, the parties must maintain
a flow of information to avoid conflict.
DoE oversees all association activities, but is too remote to provide
any operations coordination.242 The National Federation of Housing
Associations gathers and disseminates information and represents the
interests of associations at the national level, but it also is usually too
remote from operations.243 The Housing Corporation again seems to
be the logical coordination vehicle because of its more direct funding
role.
Liaison among associations has improved as local and regional
groups of associations have formed intermediate level organizations
and the National Federation has sponsored conferences and semi-
nars. 2' One liaison group, the London Housing Associations Com-
mittee, regularly meets with representatives of the London Boroughs,
the National Federation, the London Regional Office staff of the Cor-
poration, and the London Regional staff of the DoE.24
In 1977, the DoE introduced the Housing Investment Program
240. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § I, para. 30.
241. GROWING PAINs, supra note 205, at 18.
242. Id
243. Although the National Federation operates on the national level, it is instru-
mental in fostering local liaison. NFHA REsPONSE, supra note 86, § I, paras. 29-30.
244. Id at para. 29.
245. Greater London Council, Note to the Controller of Housing, Visit by Profes-
sor Hetzel 2 (June 15, 1979).
[Vol. 21:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/3
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
(HIP) concept for controlling capital expenditures by local authori-
ties.' 4 Under this system, local authorities prepare an annual re-
quest for funds. Until 1980, the request was divided into three
blocks, one for expenditure by the local authority itself, another for
grants to private parties, and a third for allocation by the authority to
housing associations.' 7 Under the 1980 legislation,248 only one cen-
tral government allocation will occur.249 The absence of a specific
category for associations, along with the deep cuts in funds for local
authorities, may substantially reduce local authority support for
housing association work.
The local authority naturally consults with housing associations to
which it expects to allocate funds, regarding the amount of such
funds and the nature of work the associations will undertake. 50 As-
sociations receiving substantial funding from local authorities nor-
mally develop a close working relationship with them, but there is an
apparent need for more cooperation. 5 '
Some local governments have not easily accepted housing associa-
tions. A DoE report in 1978252 reflects the problem:
Because we certainly believe that housing associations have a
significant if subordinate and supplementary role in the public
housing sector, we wish to encourage their use by local authori-
ties. But we are not blind to the difficulties. Whilst, generally,
very good relationships exist, some local authorities view hous-
ing associations with misgivings and make little use of them; and
on the other hand some housing associations prefer to seek
Housing Corporation finance rather than local authority finance,
thus limiting their involvement with the authority. This wari-
ness may spring from a view that the local authority can or
should meet the full need for rented housing in the district, but
often it derives from a mutual lack of knowledge and
trust. .... 253
To a great extent the roles housing associations play depend upon
their relationship with local government. The competence of both
246. CURRENT HOUSING STRATEomS, .upra note 163, app. .
247. Id § 3.2.
248. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VI.
249. Bartlett letter, .upra note 45, at 4.
250. CURIRENT HOUSING STRATEGmIs, .rpra note 163, § 4.1.
251. Id
252. Id § 1.4.
253. Id
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local government and housing associations can vary greatly, as can
local government policy regarding who should provide housing. The
national funding now available through the Housing Corporation has
changed the prior dependency of associations on local government as
a funding source. Nevertheless, local government has such a strong
lever in its planning permission powers that it is unlikely an associa-
tion could proceed where local government opposes its actions. Two
factors, however, have tended to reduce the tensions between local
government and associations.
First, the extremely deep cuts in public expenditures have forced
even the most aggressive local governments to look to other forms of
financial support to meet their housing goals.2"4 This has been espe-
cially true for rehabilitation programs in improvement areas. Most
local governments attempting to deal with areas of major housing
deterioration and social stress have readily used associations to
purchase, repair, and improve tenanted units. 255
Second, local government can nominate tenants to units developed
or rehabilitated by associations," whether the scheme is financed by
the local government or the Housing Corporation. In general, per-
sons designated by or acceptable to local government are tenants in
fifty percent of housing association units.25 7 To some degree, nomi-
nation rights would seem to depend on whether the association is
supplementing or complementing the work of local government.2 5 8
A complementary role should justify the associations' selection of
tenants who are generally outside the scope of responsibility assumed
by local government.
Since an independent perspective is one characteristic of associa-
tions, it is beneficial for local authorities to communicate with area
associations when formulating housing strategy and determining
housing requirements. Such communication is desirable whether or
not any given association will in fact receive funding through the lo-
254. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, app. II.
255. See 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
256. See THE HOUSING CORPORATION, HOUSING ASSOCIATION TENANTS 16 n.l
(1979).
257. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § 1, para. 10.
258. "Supplementing" the work of local governments means doing simply that
which a local authority would do. "Complementing" can be defined as fulfilling
needs considered to be outside the local authority's field of responsibility. CUL-
LINGwoRTH, supra note 3, at 128.
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cal authority."5 9 Formulation of an area strategy should occur
against a background of ongoing dialogue among the parties con-
cerned. Once an overall plan exists, local authorities can develop in
detail their requests for central government funds to be allocated to
associations. With both sides participating, an association can see
where its own objectives fit into the total picture.2 60
A parallel process should occur when the Housing Corporation al-
locates its own funds to associations. That is, the Corporation re-
gional office should be aware of developments in the HIP
formulation, and the local authority and the Corporation should
agree on which associations should receive support from each or both
of them.26' As part of its national responsibility, the Housing Corpo-
ration may have to consider whether it should override any local au-
thority decisions affecting associations. For instance, should it fund
rehabilitation by associations in response to requests from local resi-
dents when the local authority has declined to declare stress areas
and may be considering clearance rather than rehabilitation? Other
such variances between national and local objectives may arise, re-
quiring sensitive handling by the Corporation in its role as an instru-
ment of national policy.
The funding applications of local authorities and the Housing Cor-
poration converge in the DoE regional office.2 62 Whereas coordina-
tion between authorities and associations could theoretically take
place at this "central" location, it seems more efficient to achieve co-
ordination at the local level. The Housing Corporation and DoE
should base their approvals on conformity with national objectives
and standards after local problems have been dealt with at the local
level.2 63
In contrast to the issue of control, coordination involves the in-
formation flow between organizations. The goal is to achieve close
contact and mutual cooperation. Groups may accomplish this infor-
mally in areas in which only a few associations operate under a single
authority; but more complicated situations may necessitate a formal
mechanism.26
259. CuRRENr HousINo STRATEGIES, supra note 163, § 3.10.
260. Id
261. Id § 3.13.
262. See id § 3.
263. See id §4.
264. Id § 4.2.
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Most larger, active local authorities have appointed one officer to
be responsible for contacts with associations.265 Such focused coordi-
nation, if it does not preclude direct contact between the association
and other authority officers,266 seems preferable to ad hoc meetings
between individual associations and local authorities. The contact
officer can gather information enabling the authority to determine
which associations it should invite to meet specific identified
needs. 267
In addition, representatives from the local authority, the area hous-
ing associations, the National Federation, and the Housing Corpora-
tion could form a liaison group similar to the London Housing
Associations Committee.2 61 It might also be useful to include a rep-
resentative of the DoE regional office. Where many associations op-
erate in the same area, a committee of local associations could
appoint a few representatives to the liaison group.2 6 9
The right of local authorities to nominate tenants for association
housing creates another coordination problem. ° One study indi-
cated that eighteen percent of new housing association tenants come
from local authority housing, and over twenty-five percent of new
tenants are nominated by local authorities. 71 Who will nominate
which tenants can be a major area of conflict, although this problem
seems to have abated through local negotiations.272
Another area of coordination concerns rent comparisons between
associations and local authorities. A Rent Officer determines "fair
rent" rates which govern both housing associations and the private
265. Id § 43.
266. Id
267. Id § 4.5.
268. Id See also note 245 and accompanying text supra.
269. CURRENT HOUSING STRATEGIES, supra note 163, § 4.6.
270. Part of the cooperation between local authorities and housing associations
should occur in the determination of who will be housed in the mix of available subsi-
dized housing. DoE intends that housing associations should to some extent accom-
modate local authority nominations of tenants to housing association units. DoE,
HousING AcT 1974, supra note 117, at para. 31.
271. These figures exclude "sitting tenants," who become tenants by reason of
being occupants of existing housing at the time the association acquires it. THE
HOUsING CORPORATION, HOUSING ASSOCIATION TENANTS, paras. 5.8 and 5.11
(1979).
272. See, ,,g., NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § I, para. 11.
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sector. Local authorities, on the other hand, set their own rents.273
Because local authorities normally have a stock of housing which is
already paid for, they can pool rents to offset some of the impact of
higher costs for new projects. In addition, they can further subsidize
their housing programs with their own tax revenues.274 Thus, local
authority rents are often substantially lower than those set for hous-
ing associations.275 As a consequence, a varying level of subsidy may
be paid for housing a local authority applicant, depending on which
body ultimately houses him. 6 Although in either situation the ten-
ant will receive a substantial economic benefit, the Committee of
Public Accounts admits that there is "an element of illogicality" in
this situation which needs resolution. 77
The National Federation of Housing Associations recommends
that the Rent Officer continue to set new rents, but that his criteria
include comparable rents in the public sector.278 The Federation fur-
ther suggests that associations retain some flexibility to make minor
adjustments within prescribed average rent ranges.279
The 1980 legislation will permit associations to increase rents more
rapidly than in the past.280 Despite central government pressures on
local authorities to raise council housing rents, the result of the new
policies is likely to be a growing, not decreasing, gap between associ-
ation and local authority rent levels.28'
V. PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS: HOUSING
ASSOCIATIONS CAN ACHIEVE RESULTS
Although housing association properties still represent a small per-
centage of the total housing stock, their contribution to growth has
recently become more substantial.
For the year ending March 31, 1978, Housing Corporation-funded
schemes added 17,091 new and 4,924 rehabilitated units to the hous-
273. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. V, para. 7.
274. Id
275. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § III, para. 80.
276. COMMITTEE OF PUBLIc AccouNts, supra note 5, at x, paras. 14-1
277. Id
278. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § III, para. 87.
279. Id at para. 88.
280. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part II, § 59.
281. King letter, supra note 18, at 3.
5.
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ing stock.2 82 Completions by housing associations represented 16.1%
of those in the public sector and 8.6% of all completions.283 In calen-
dar year 1977, new building starts by housing associations in Great
Britain represented twenty-one percent of those in the public sector;
approvals for association rehabilitation projects made up one-third of
public sector rehabilitation.284 Access to funds limits the ability of
associations to provide units. Production has fallen recently because
of rising costs and reduced funding;285 nevertheless, associations have
continued to produce. In fiscal year 1977-78, the balance of housing
association scheme approvals shifted from new building to rehabilita-
tion.286 Having assumed their envisioned role in concentrated area
improvement strategies and the reversal and prevention of urban de-
cay, associations are now the major agents of rehabilitation in many
urban areas.287
Housing association activity in specially designated housing reha-
bilitation area programs2 8 was as high as sixty-six percent of their
total activity in one region.28 9 A very small proportion of this type of
activity in the London region is attributable to agreements with local
authorities. Under such agreements, the Housing Corporation con-
centrates association work on the periphery of special areas while lo-
cal government handles work within the areas. 90
The latest figures indicate that associations have maintained their
record of activity, subject only to funding support. In the year ending
March 31, 1980, the Housing Corporation approved loans for a total
of 41,369 new and improved homes in England, Scotland, and
282. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
283. Id
284. Id
285. The Housing Corporation points out that it was able to utilize all available
funds. In absolute numbers, more units were approved in 1977-78 than in the previ-
ous annual period, but the total activity was lower than had been anticipated. Id at
5.
286. Id at 9.
287. Id
288. These special area improvement designations include Housing Action Areas,
Priority Neighborhoods, and General Improvement Areas. Though they were only
listed as categories in which housing association projects would be encouraged under
the 1974 Act, these areas of acute housing stress have received increased priority. Id
289. Id
290. Id
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Wales.29" ' For the 1981 financial year, the Corporation has received a
cash allocation of £420 million (covering schemes approved in previ-
ous years, new schemes, and major repairs) and a limit of £368.4 mil-
lion on the estimated cost of new approvals during the last year.292
Were they all to be "fair rented" projects fully supported by HAGs,
this would represent some 21,500 units in all.2 93
Production is not necessarily successful if it is achieved at too high
a cost. To judge the cost efficiency of housing associations, the obvi-
ous comparison is with local authority housing. These two types of
housing organizations have somewhat different mixes of properties,
however, which makes meaningful comparisons difficult.294 The ma-
jority of housing association units, having only one or two bedrooms,
are smaller in size than a large proportion of local authority hous-
ing.29- A lack of data restricts direct comparison, but since both
organizations must conform generally to the same space standards
and cost limits, there is no reason to suppose that associations are any
less efficient than local authorities in terms of capital costs of
units. 2 97 With similar difficulties in obtaining comparable data, there
is no indication of a significant difference in management costs be-
tween the two.298 The raw data available indicate lower per unit
costs on both capital expenditure and maintenance for housing asso-
ciation properties than for local authority properties.2 99
Development time is another measure of efficiency in which hous-
ing associations compare favorably. There appears to be no signifi-
cant difference in construction time between local authority and
association housing.3" In terms of overall development time, how-
ever, housing association schemes average three and one-half years
compared to five or six years for local authority projects.3° ' To be
fair, one should recognize that local authorities have additional diffi-
291. Bartlett letter, supra note 45, at 5.
292. Id
293. Id
294. COMMirrEE OF PUBLiC AccouNTs, supra note 5, app. V, paras. 2-4.
295. Id at para. 2.
296. Id at para. 3.
297. Id at para. 10.
298. Id at para. 6.
299. Id at paras. 4 and 6.
300. Id at para. 5.
301. NFHA STUDy, supra note 12, at 68.
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
culties3°2 that contribute to their longer development times. Never-
theless, time is an important factor in housing delivery, and a project
apparently can be completed faster by a housing association. 30 3 Lim-
ited data also indicate that association development takes only three
months longer than does private sector development (thirty-five
months as compared with thirty-two months).3° This is a notably
small difference given the complex approval process required for
grant-aided projects.3 °5
Housing associations respond to the needs of tenants who have
special housing requirements that are not otherwise met. A large
number of association dwellings accommodate the elderly.3 6 As-
sociations provide housing tailored to suit the needs of such other
groups as the physically handicapped,30 7 the mentally retarded, 08
and former psychiatric patients.30 9 Specialized management and
services required by these groups are part of the package which hous-
ing associations can furnish.31° Hostels are another form of housing
that associations provide. 1  One association in the London area
even caters to the needs of artists, providing studio and residential
accommodation. 312 A shortage of housing for single people and
small families exists in Britain. Thus a large proportion of associa-
tion housing is in the form of bedsitting rooms and one bedroom
flats.3 13 Associations meet numerous other special needs in terms of
providing units to accommodate those with special requirements.
314
Housing associations also provide flexibility in responding to the
302. Local authority projects often involve compulsory purchase. See, e.g., Id§§ 3-4.
303. Id at 69.
304. Id
305. Id
306. The Housing Corporation uses over one-half of new construction resources
in providing accommodations for the increasing numbers of elderly in England.
1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
307. Id
308. Id
309. Id
310. MERSEYSIDE IMPROVED HousEs, supra note 15, at 23-24.
311. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
312. Greater London Council-Housing Dept., Note to the Controller of Hous-
ing, Visit by Professor Hetzel 2-3 (from the Assistant Director "R," 1979).
313. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
314. See MERSEYSIDE IMPROVED HousEs, supra note 15, at 23-24.
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needs of individuals with regard to tenant selection.31 5 Some associa-
tions fear that publicizing tenant selection criteria could lead to an
undesirable rigidity.316 Although it is difficult to evaluate the flex-
ibility of tenant selection, a major survey found that housing associa-
tions gave tenancies to a significantly high proportion of single
people and families with young children (particularly single parent
families). The survey also found that most of those tenants had low
incomes and came from inadequate or insecure housing.317
Another important element of housing associations is tenant-sensi-
tive management. The attitudes of tenants provide perhaps the best
barometer of this function. One study among tenants of a very large
housing association found that ninety percent of those who had any
future preference for a particular type of landlord would remain with
the association because they thought management service was "per-
sonal, reliable and efficient. ' 318 Fifty-seven percent of all tenants
had no criticism; in addition, many were familiar with the goals of
the organization. 3 19 These results appear consistent with the goal of
Merseyside Improved Houses (MIH), the subject of this survey, to
insure that every tenant knows at least one staff member by name.320
The National Federation of Housing Associations has published
the MIH tenant selection criteria as a guideline and example of good
selection policy.321 MIH has a primary goal of providing for those
with greatest housing needs.322 This goal conflicts to some extent
with MIH's activity in Housing Action Areas (HAAs), which empha-
sizes restoration of the area rather than the characteristics of individ-
uals housed.3 ' A problem stems from the large number of properties
acquired in HAAs with sitting tenants, and the MIH policy against
displacing them.324 Because acquiring vacant properties in HAAs is
315. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, supra note 206, at para. 10.
316. Id
317. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, HOUSING ASSOCIATION TENANTS para. 5.6
(1979).
318. A. THOMPSON, THE ROLE OF HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN MAJOR URBAN
AREAS: A CASE STUDY OF MERSEYSIDE IMPROVED HouSEs 93 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as MAJOR URBAN AREAS].
319. Id
320. Id
321. THE HOUSING CORPORATION, supra note 206, at Annex B.
322. See MAJOR URBAN AREAS, supra note 318, at 105.
323. Id at 105-06.
324. Id at 105-08.
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difficult, MIH argues against confining activity to special planning
areas when this interferes with the association's priority for tenant
selection.325 The judgment of MIH seems to be that people are more
important than places, although both need attention in ultimately
solving the housing problem.
Sensitivity to tenants' needs is of great concern, especially where
association growth may cause management to become remote from
those being housed. Recommendations to avoid such remoteness in-
clude maintaining a degree of personal contact with tenants,326 pro-
viding written information (perhaps including a newsletter), and
encouraging the formation of tenant groups to provide additional
channels of communication.327 Proper and efficient organization of
management activity can prevent the scale of operations from inter-
fering with quality in areas such as rent collection, repairs, and reha-
bilitation of property acquired with sitting tenants.328
Indications are that housing associations provide more responsive
management than either the private sector or public landlord. 329 The
numerical success and the quality of management discussed above
show that associations do supply a viable "third choice" in the hous-
ing field.
Along with their responsiveness in management and tenant selec-
tion, housing associations manifest flexibility in the design area. A
measure of their sensitivity and creativity is the large number of de-
sign awards that association projects have received.330 Moreover, as-
sociation housing schemes incorporating innovative solar heating
systems have furnished experimental data on energy efficiency to ar-
chitects and environmental designers.33'
In one case, an association scheme utilized financing and building
code standards from the private sector,332 which saved an estimated
£2,000 in construction costs. An additional estimated £2,000 saving
325. Id
326. GROWINrG PAINS, supra note 205, at 7. Using resident managers or delegat-
ing liaison to particular tenants are examples of methods of maintaining contact.
327. Id Tenant groups might include tenant associations or committees to inves-
tigate problems.
328. See id at 9-10.
329. See MAJOR URBAN AREAS, supra note 318, at 93.
330. NFHA RESPONSE, supra note 86, § I, para. 25.
331. MERSEYSIDE IMPROVED HousEs, supra note 15, at 26.
332. Id at 27.
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resulted from time saved in not having to obtain the detailed approv-
als required by DoE and the Housing Corporation for grant-aided
projects.333 The estimated saving of thirty percent per unit on this
scheme should prove an interesting piece of information in the de-
bate over housing standards and cost efficiency.2 Furthermore, the
project illustrates the dual public/private nature of housing associa-
tions, in that nothing prevents them from experimenting outside of
the parameters of government aid.
Associations have shown considerable skill in marshalling public
funds from sources beyond the statutory framework of association
subsidies to implement a variety of unusual projects. Associations
have used grants for historical preservation, 335 environmental
cleanup,336 and public labor subsidy,337 and have helped other com-
munity groups to obtain public funds.3 38
Housing associations have become an instrument for the develop-
ment of alternative forms of tenure. In the last few years, the govern-
ment has taken three new initiatives with respect to the form of
housing associations. 339 These are co-ownership, a variation of co-
ownership called community leasehold, and housing cooperatives.
Although still in an experimental state, they reflect interest by a suffi-
cient number of advocates to justify governmental support.
Co-ownership, as now revived, has improved over the original
scheme in terms of equity sharing. Current co-ownership financing
entails a building society loan for one-half the cost, a HAG for one-
sixth, and a second mortgage from the Housing Corporation for one-
third.3" The joint mortgage, reduced by the option mortgage factor,
is paid from the co-owner's rent.341 Although the estate remains with
the association (society), a departing co-owner receives one-half of
any increase in equity during his residence with a guarantee of no
lOSS. 34 2
333. Id
334. Id
335. Id at 28.
336. Id at 32-33.
337. Id. at 34.
338. Id at 37.
339. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, ch. 7.
340. Id at 124.
341. Id
342. Id
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The community leasehold allows buyers to purchase a portion of
the lease, initially fifty percent, and to pay rent on the remainder.343
Upon leaving, they are entitled to a proportionate share of any ap-
preciation in the unit's value. 3" The society retains the leasehold
and the buyer finances the portion he purchases with a building soci-
ety mortgage. 34
5
The British origin of the cooperative movement has not fully re-
flected itself in the housing field. The concept surely is attractive to
those interested in neither council housing at subsidized rents nor the
advantages of traditional homeownership. 46 The member's equity
interest, however, will be limited to the par value of the share
purchased without any rights to appreciation.347 The concept in-
volves commitment to shared management and a desire for commu-
nity rather than individualized home ownership.
The government has performed several experiments with coopera-
tives, despite the apparent economic disincentive.348 The Housing
Corporation initially formed a Co-operative Housing Agency under
the Corporation's Control to promote various types of cooperative
housing.349 The agency has now become a Co-operative Services
Unit within the Corporation's Housing Policy Division. 50 Whether
such experimental efforts will generate increased interest and major
policy thrusts is not yet clear. These programs are in their early
stages and constitute a small part of association activity;35' as a factor
in housing policy they currently have minimal significance. They re-
flect, however, the creative potential of the housing association move-
ment and represent one more facet of the variety in housing choice
that associations can provide.
Finally, housing associations have also demonstrated some useful
343. Id at 125.
344. Id
345. Id
346. Id at 125-26. See DoE, FINAL REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON Hous-
wo COOPERATIVEs (1975).
347. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 3, at 125.
348. Several circumstances, such as dissatisfaction with the present focus of hous-
ing, converged to bolster interest in cooperative housing. Effective lobbying for alter-
native forms of tenure likewise sparked official interest. See id at 126-27.
349. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7 and 16-17.
350. Bartlett letter, supra note 45, at 5.
351. 1977-1978 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7 and 16-17.
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alternatives to approaches taken by public sector council housing.
Associations have avoided some of this sector's worst excesses, such
as large local authority building programs with tower, high-rise
blocks or vast estates. Typically, housing association structures are
architect-designed and attractive;352 estates rarely exceed one hun-
dred houses and frequently are on a more human scale of about
thirty.353
A number of new initiatives for associations will now be possible
because of provisions in the 1980 legislation. As part of the revisions
introduced by the Conservative government, non-charitable housing
associations354 will have to offer to sell their units to many sitting
tenants.355 Tenants will receive discounts of thirty-three to fifty per-
cent from appraised value, based upon length of occupancy.356 The
revisions also provide the right to obtain a mortgage from the Hous-
ing Corporation, limited only by the tenant's ability to repay.357 Ten-
ants can purchase the freehold of a house, or a 125-year lease for a
flat.3"' "Shared ownership" will also be possible; the association will
retain a part of the interest in the property with a consequent reduc-
tion in cost to the purchasing tenant.359
The 1980 legislation empowers and encourages associations to ac-
quire and rehabilitate units for sale.360 Rehabilitation costs less than
new construction and allows associations to help revive run-down ar-
eas by introducing diversity of tenure as well as by improving and
repairing the structures. 36' Associations will receive a grant of up to
£5,000 per dwelling should there be an adverse gap between cost and
sale price.362
One consequence of the government's sales policy is to free addi-
tional funds for the association's use. Proceeds of sales will first re-
352. Scotland Housing Association, Housing Finance Review 1 (1975).
353. See REGISTRATION, supra note 21.
354. NFHA GUIDE, supra note 87, at 4.
355. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part I, § 1.
356. Id § 7.
357. Id § 9.
358. Id §§ 1, 17, sch. 2.
359. Id part IX, § 140, sch. 3, 18.
360. Id part VIII, § 127.
361. NFHA GUIDE, supra note 87, at 20.
362. Housing Act, 1980, c. 51, part VIII, § 130.
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deem outstanding loans and repay HAGs, 363 but associations can
recycle any surpluses for housing purposes.3 " These funds should
help to give associations greater independence of action.
Although the problems of control, coordination, and efficiency
have not found final solution, housing associations have worked suc-
cessfully at achieving their purposes. Even in the present period of
more limited governmental support, they have been given a most
meaningful role. Considering the complexity of housing problems
and the fact that housing associations are made up of people with
human frailties, the British voluntary housing movement seems to be
doing a remarkably good job.
VI. HOUSING AsSOCIATIONS IN AMERICA: A BEGINNING?
Whether the housing association concept will be viable in the
United States is a question that could be answered in the coming
years. Representative Bingham of New York introduced a bill3 65 in
the 96th Congress to establish a National Mutual Housing Corpora-
tion to promote the development of "mutual housing associations" in
America. The bill defined these associations as private, not-for-profit
corporations whose purpose is to develop and manage multi-family
housing for low- and moderate-income people in inner-city areas.366
Anticipated characteristics consist of a voluntary management com-
mittee, professional staff, and a meaningful consultation role for
tenants.
The proposed role for these housing associations in inner-city
housing developments is reminiscent of the associations' role in im-
provement of urban areas in Britain.368 While the term "mutual
housing association" reflects an intent to include cooperative hous-
ing, cooperative projects represent but one of several models. As-
sociations, as they are developed in the United States, may differ
363. Id § 131.
364. NFHA GUIDE, supra note 87, at 22-23.
365. H.R. 5111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
366. 125 Cong. Rec. H7166 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Bingham)
[hereinafter cited as CONG. REc. (Bingham)].
367. Id at H7167.
368. Id The concentration of housing association activity in area improvement
programs is a direct attack on the deterioration of urban centers. See note 286-89 and
accompanying text supra.
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from traditional cooperative housing projects. 369 Cooperatives are
clearly of limited attraction and utility, which explains why they are
not the prevalent models in Europe.
The concept of mutual housing associations should be seen to en-
compass the functions presently carried out by housing associations
in Britain. The current descriptions of the mutual housing associa-
tion concept reflect a number of parallels, in terms of structure and
rationale, with the development of the British associations.
370
Housing associations are a response to rising construction costs and
the breakdown of private market provision of residential housing in
inner city areas.371 As in Britain, the government is seeking alterna-
tive solutions to housing problems because public and private efforts
have failed.372 The bill contemplated a National Mutual Housing
Corporation to promote the development of housing associations in
much the same way that the Housing Corporation in England
emerged to promote them. Because the housing association concept
is new to America, the existence of a promotional body such as the
Corporation would seem highly desirable.373
The Corporation could be an independent public entity whose task
is to assist in the formation of housing associations by providing tech-
nical assistance, "seed" grants, and general information.37 4 The Cor-
poration would aid associations in applying for public funding under
existing housing programs. It would also lead in developing both the
role of associations and new Federal programs to support housing
association activities. 3
75
As proposed, the Corporation would be headed by a board of di-
rectors which would include the Secretary of HUD, the Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank,
the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration, two
members from housing associations, two members from the general
public with extensive experience in cooperative housing, one repre-
369. See CONG. REC. (Bingham), supra note 366, at H7167.
370. Id Emphasizing the resident's role, whether as tenant or cooperative owner,
provides a number of alternative models for non-profit housing associations.
371. Id at H7166.
372. Id
373. Id at H7167.
374. Id
375. Id at H7167-68.
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sentative for credit unions, and one representative for consumers.376
The President would appoint persons to fill the latter six of these po-
sitions.377 The composition of the board seeks representation from a
number of fields vital to the success of the concept, and apparently
intends to promote the spread of information to other institutions.
Housing associations qualifying for assistance would be corporate
bodies independent of the National Corporation.378 Their opera-
tions would include the planning and development of housing
projects and the raising of capital finance to execute projects. 379
The model described in the legislation is a hybrid cooperative. It
would give residents the option to purchase stock for an equity share
in the association (which owns the project), or to become non-share-
holding members and pay rent (allowing those who cannot afford
capital investment to participate).380 Membership in the association
would insure responsible management; the similarities to cooperative
housing are obvious. 381 Retaining ownership and management re-
sponsibility over projects in an association, whether or not a coopera-
tive, prevents the "milking" of property for profits which can be a
major problem with private sector housing in inner-city areas.38 On
the other hand, since the association is a private entity, the red tape of
public housing is avoided. 83
The proposed model of mutual housing associations could provide
cost-rent to tenants, but limits tenants to those with at least moderate
incomes unless subsidies are available. The bill views rental income
as a source of financing for new projects. 3 4 Though subsidies
through federal programs may become available, there is no large
direct subsidy to the association as there is in Britain.385 When subsi-
dies issue from various programs, the problems of dealing with the
376. H.R. 5111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
377. Id
378. CONG. REc. (Bingham), supra note 366, at H7168.
379. Id at H7166-67.
380. Id at H7167.
381. Id
382. Id
383. Id
384. Id
385. Id The mutual housing association is intended to generate its own capital
finance, with the possible exceptions of seed grants and subsidies from other
programs.
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bureaucracy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) arise.
Non-profit housing entities have operated sporadically in this
country.386 The existence of housing development corporations dur-
ing the last decade and the continuing presence of traditional cooper-
atives attest to the resilience of this movement. Nevertheless, several
ingredients have been missing. First, there has been no real national
policy support. Occasional private, non-profit initiatives have re-
ceived little response beyond simple recognition of their existence.
Government public housing bureaucrats and self-interested profit de-
velopers have effectively restrained growth of the concept. Second,
there has been no entity equivalent to the National Housing Corpora-
tion, an essential element in British policy. Neither a constituency
building nor an effective monitoring and support function has been
developed. Furthermore, a sufficient base has never formed, as in
Britain, for a national federation to provide training and constituent
representation.
Third, professional staffing was almost unheard of in efforts prior
to the recent proposal. Reliance on untrained housing amateurs pro-
duced the predictable result of large numbers of failures by non-
profit corporations.3" 7 While well-intended at the outset, the few
skilled professionals who helped start a project did not get involved
in the day-to-day management when things went wrong.388 Since
few initiators of a project went on to subsequent projects, experience
was absent in each new endeavor; there was no learning curve at all.
Fourth, a well-coordinated subsidy program has not existed to meet
the specific needs of non-profit corporations. Tailoring programs to
meet needs of non-profit developers has proved ineffective.389 For
example, there was no support for initial organization of the corpora-
386. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERI-
CAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 134-48 (1968).
387. See A DECENT HOME, s-upra note 1, at 91.
388. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 386, at 137-
39.
389. Several American programs have financed non-profits: the § 202 direct loan
rogram (providing guaranteed mortgages at below-market interest rates); the
213(d) program (aimed at fostering cooperative housing); and the § 236 interest-
reduction subsidy. All of these programs were available to non-profit housing "spon-
sors." "Tailoring," however, was generally limited to permitting 100%, rather than
90%, mortgage financing for non-profit sponsors. The willingness to dispense with an
investment by non-profit groups does not necessarily provide sufficient incentives for
construction, nor does it eliminate the need for pre-construction funds. Furthermore,
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tion, and no provision for seed money; subsequent reimbursement
requires that other funds be available initially. To be effective, a new
program needs to address all four of these factors.
The mutual housing association proposal satisfies several of these
ingredients, and may prove quite successful in developing co-owner-
ship. With some expansion from the currently proposed structure, it
could develop into a subsidy delivery system paralleling the success
of the British housing associations with their many advantages.
What appears necessary is experimentation with several models of
housing associations to find the combination that would work best
here. The present proposal resembles the phase immediately follow-
ing the 1961 British legislation that fostered many successful cost-rent
schemes.390 Some of the cost-rent schemes in Britain however, have
required substantial improvements and related capital outlays be-
cause of the low building standards used to make them economically
viable.39' The objective should be, as it was in the British program,
to stimulate private commitment to effective production and manage-
ment of units and to make public loans available for financing.
In section 316 of the 1980 Housing Act,392 Congress acknowledged
the potential of mutual housing associations to help "make multifam-
ily housing in the United States more affordable." Congress also
praised "the efforts being made in connection with the national dem-
onstration program of mutual housing associations being undertaken
by the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and the National
Consumer Cooperative Bank with the cooperation of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development." 393
The participants in this demonstration program are to transmit a
report to Congress on their findings and conclusions along with legis-
lative recommendations by September, 1981.394 Although the early
reporting date seems somewhat ambitious, the Senate and House Re-
ports for the Act reflect an expectation that four associations should
100% financing does not obviate the need for management and operating cost subsi-
dies where projects involve families with low incomes. See, e.g., id at 136-48.
390. See text at notes 42-44 supra.
391. King letter, supra note 18, at 2.
392. Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399,
§ 316(a), 94 Stat. 1645 (1980).
393. Id
394. Id § 328(b).
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receive assistance through the demonstration.395
The advantage of the voluntary non-profit concept is its flexibility
in providing both a form of homeownership and a professionally
managed source of multi-family rentals. Such British ideas as equity
sharing are quite consistent with the concept of mutual housing as-
sociations. Thus, the association can be a vehicle for a number of
alternative approaches to tenure and management of housing.
The essential elements of the concept are a non-profit corporate
structure which develops and owns properties it manages, a profes-
sional staff, and resident membership in the association (or limited
equity ownership in the cooperative). A number of European ap-
proaches provide alternative models; the British model is especially
relevant.
Although some observers suggest that resident investments could
provide a source of seed money or investment capital,396 that seems
an unreasonable expectation given the intended resident target group
of low- and moderate-income families. Labor unions or churches
might initially fund associations in the United States as has occurred
in Germany and Holland.3 97 The National Consumer Cooperative
Bank398 and local government Community Development Block
Grant39 9 funds also represent possible sources for such support. The
most appropriate approach would entail, as in Britain, financing and
subsidies specifically tailored to support and tap the energies inherent
in the voluntary, non-profit housing association movement.
Given the obvious need for governmental support for low- and
moderate-income housing, housing associations offer an opportunity
to reduce government's direct role. At the same time, voluntary
housing associations increase the options for private initiative. More-
over, associations provide an alternative for serving low- and moder-
ate-income families which is potentially cheaper than either private
for-profit development or traditional public housing. Housing as-
sociations can rehabilitate inner-city areas and serve the needs of
395. S. REp. No. 736, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. REP. No. 979, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980).
396. See CONG. REC. (Bingham), supra note 366, at H7168.
397. See, e.g., The German Marshall Fund, Perspectives 1 (Oct. 1980).
398. National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3050 (Supp.
III 1979).
399. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5319
(Supp. III 1979).
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groups with special requirements, including the handicapped and the
elderly.
The success of other Western countries with free-market econo-
mies in implementing housing association programs suggests the ap-
propriateness of employing similar programs here. Whereas
alternative models must be evaluated and viable demonstrations de-
veloped, the experience in Britain indicates that the private non-
profit sector can and will respond rapidly to appropriate incentives.
Freed from excessive government controls, this responsiveness can be
harnessed to meet the housing needs of the increasing portion of our
population that requires governmental financing to obtain a decent
home in a suitable living environment.
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APPENDIX: HAG EXAMPLES
REHABILITATION OF A TYPICAL
VACANT 2 BEDROOM TERRACE HOUSE POUNDS DOLLARS
ACQUISITION COSTS .................... £2,000 $4,320
LEGAL FEES ............................. 200 432
ACQUISITION ALLOWANCES (Basic) ..... 165 356.40
VACANT SUPPLEMENT .................. 45 97.20
IMPROVEMENT COSTS .................. 11,000 23,760
ARCHITECT'S FEES ...................... 1,100 2,376
IMPROVEMENT ALLOWANCES (Basic) ... 240 518.40
NEW TENANCY ALLOWANCES .......... 75 162
BRIDGING INTEREST .................... 350 756
CAPITALISED INTEREST ................ 150 324
TOTAL COSTS ............................ 15,325 33,102
EXPENDITURE
ANNUAL RUNNING COSTS
REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE .......... 200 432
MANGEMENT 110 237.60
ANNUAL RUNNING COSTS .............. 310 669.60
ANNUAL INCOME
RENTS ................................... 375 810
LESS 4% VOIDS ........................... 15 32.40
360 777.60
EXCESS OF INCOME OVER
EXPENDITURE
INCOME OF .............................. 360
LESS EXPENDITURE ..................... 310
NET INCOME ............................ 50
To calculate the mortgage the net income in
the 1st year i.e. £50 is capitalised over the
thirty year loan period
50 x 6.57969038 (From annuity tables
based on 15% interest
over 30 years) .............. 329
Therfore Housing Association Grant will be
the total capital costs of 15,325
Less the morgage of ........................ 329
i.e. 14,996
Housing Association Grant = 98% ........... £14,996 $32,391.36
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NEWLY BUILT 2 BEDROOM HOUSE POUNDS DOLLARS
LAND COSTS ............................. £1,000 $2,160
BUILDING COSTS ........................ 15,000 32,400
PROF FEES ............................... 1,200 2,592
ALLOWANCES ........................... 1,000 2,160
CAPITALISED INTEREST ................ 1,000 2,160
19,200 41,472
EXPENDITURE
MANAGEMENT .......................... 80 172.80
MAINTENANCE .......................... 100 216
HIGHER MANAGEMENT ................. 25 54
205 442.80
INCOME
RENTS ................................... 550 1,188
LESS VOIDS .............................. 22 47.52
528 1,140.48
INCOME ................................. 528 1,140.48
LESS EXPENDITURE ..................... 205 442.80
ANNUAL NET INCOME IN FIRST YEAR. 323
323 x 6.66553194 (Based on 15%
interest over
60 years) 2,153
The total mortgage per unit is therefore ....... 2,153
Housing Association Grant required .......... 17,047
i.e. Capital Costs ........................... 19,200
Less mortgage ........................... 2,153
SUMMARY
CAPITAL COST PER UNIT ............... 19,200 41,472
MORTGAGE ............................. 2,153 4,650.48
HOUSING ASSOCIATION GRANT = 89%. 17,047 36,821.52
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